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ABSTRACT
Title of Thesis: Resource Allocation for the United States Navy
Attack Carrier Striking Force in the 1968-1980
Period.
James F. Jenista, Jr., Master of Arts, 1967.
Thesis directed by: William A. Niskanen, Ph.D.
Neil M. Singer, Ph.D.
The problem of efficient allocation of scarce resources occurs
in industry and in military planning. Replacement schedules for
existing production equipment can be analyzed for both organizations
using the same techniques.
Replacement of the remaining World War II - built HANCOCK-
class aircraft carriers is scheduled for the mid-19 70 period. The
hypothesis is tested that replacement can be made earlier than sched-
uled with no increase in cost. Two alternative replacement schedules
are set forth, using conventional-power carriers in one and nuclear-
power carriers in the other.
Methods of conducting a cost-effectiveness analysis of this
type are discussed in some detail. The method of setting the
alternatives equal in cost and measuring the resulting effectiveness
is selected. Marginal effectiveness and its analysis are discussed.
The techniques for estimating system cost and adjustment of
force levels to set them equal are illustrated with unclassified
examples. Hypothetical scenarios postulated in order to allow force
effectiveness to be measured are then described and illustrated.

Discussion of the results of the classified analysis is carried
out in unclassified terms. It is emphasized that analysis of this
type does not determine which alternative should be chosen. It pro-
vides the decision-maker with a logical presentation of the probable
consequences of each alternative set forth for the analysis so that
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The problem of efficient allocation of scarce resources exists
in some form in every industry.
Consider the Edge-Ring Division of Consolidated Corridors, Ltd,
This firm produces a single output for consumption in a highly com=
petitive industry , Its production process is shown in block diagram
form in Figure 1.
The plant has a number of B~machines 3 of varying ages and capa-
cities o The process requires one B~machine connected with a set of
the auxiliary machines labeled A, , 3 A,,^ etc. Certain inputs are
provided by E and S; the quantity depends on the particular model B
in use.
Production scheduling is further complicated by some incompati-
bilities; certain models of the A., cannot be connected with some of
the B.j or j if connected, will not operate with any degree of
efficiency.
The production manager has been directed to submit his proposed
program for replacement of outmoded and/or worn out machines for the
next few years, This program will be a complex one, since a number
of factors must be taken into consideration , First , his budget is
constrained by corporate headquarters, Within his budget limitations,
he must attempt to produce the "best" possible output, The defini-
tion of "best" itself requires that some form of measurement of the
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everyone concerned. Second , the fact that the industry is highly
competitive means that other firms' threats to Edge-Ring's share
of the market must be taken into consideration. This is especially
true in the time-phasing of equipment purchases planned to take ad-
vantage of product improvements in their design. Finally, the possi-
ble loss of investment returns from, other purchases which might be
made with the capital funds available must be balanced against the
expected gains from early investment in machinery with a greater
capacity. One example would be the investing of capital funds in
securities offering a high interest rate 3 and postponing the equip-
ment purchase. Net revenue gain might be greater in this manner,
although the possibility of competitive firms capturing Edge-Ring's
share of the market could seriously affect the future revenue pre-
dictions, Uncertainty about future demand is a major factor in
this decision; often the only source of this vital item is a sub-
jective evaluation of the market.
Faced with a problem of such magnitude and complexity, the
manager is greatly assisted by the proper use of the analytic tools
of economic decision-making, Proper analysis will allow him to
compare the relative merits and disadvantages of any proposed plan
or set of plans before coming to a decision on which one to propose.
The analyst must not only rank the alternatives in terms of output,
: I must indicate the marginal cost involved in accepting each
alternative;, as well as the marginal cost of rejecting the others.
Military decision-making in the Department of Defense encounters
very much the same sort of problems, L 'onomic analysis in a mili
tary con r:e> T . is critical for two very imporl reasons. The

resources available to the nation as a whole, and therefore for
its defense, are limited and require efficient allocation to their
alternative uses. At the same time, the cost of failure to pro-
vide adequate defense may be incalculable. The risk associated
with any specific level of defense by virture of the uncertainty
of future world events further complicates the problem. In terms
of our hypothetical firm, it compares with the uncertainty of pre-
dicting future demand
.
The United States Navy attack carrier striking forces are
charged with production of a single 9 but multidimensional, output,
described by their mission:
,T
. „ .to serve as floating air bases; to engage
any forces afloat and ashore which threaten our ,
control of the sea; and to support other forces. TT
The force is currently composed of sixteen aircraft carriers,
fifteen of them in commission, and seventeen carrier air wings.
Force elements are listed in Table 1 at the end of this chapter.
The aircraft currently in use or under development are listed in
Table 2.
Efficient allocation of resources in the attack carrier
striking force is directly involved with the planned replacement
of its capital equipment. The problem is directly analogous to
that facing the Edge-Ring Division; each carrier and its associated
air wing form- a production unit, requiring both escorts and support
ships in order to function. Some combinations of aircraft and ship
are impractical, or relatively inefficient. The scarce resource is
'Frank Uhlig 9 Jr. fed.). Naval Review 19 6 >- 1963 (Annapolis, Md
.
United States Naval Institute, 1962), pT'219 7
"

the assigned share of the National Defense Budget; maximum effi-
ciency in its allocation is vital to our nation's survival,
The first five carriers listed in Table 1 were originally con-
structed as ESSEX-class carriers during and after World War II. A
number of modifications have been made to these carriers in order
to adapt them for use with modern jet aircraft. Despite these
extensive changes, these carriers are approaching obselescence.
As the. HANCOCK-class carriers become older , they require
continuous repair and costly improvement to keep them in operation.
Certain of the newer aircraft are unable to operate from this class
notably the F-4 and the F-111B, the current and next-generation
2fighter aircraft. The currently assigned fighter, the F-8
Crusader , was first delivered to the fleet in I960. A modifica-
tion program is under way to extend the life of some of rhese air-
3
craft for use aboard the HANCOCK-class.
The size of modern jet aircraft is another important factor
which affects the decision to retire the HANCOCK-class. Ships
The most readily observed changes are an angled deck for land-
ing, enclosed bow, number three elevator moved to the deck edge,
steam catapults, and the mirror landing system, Internal modifi-
cations are numerous and continuing. The U.S.S. ORTSKANY (CVA-34)-
is equipped with the Naval Tactical Data System, an automated, com-
puter-assisted air defense system which will ultimately be installed
on all attack carriers . Former ESSEX-class carriers with the modi-
fications listed above are now considered the HANCOCK-class; their
conversion is referred to as the 27-C conversion, Source: Raymond
V. B. Blackman (ed.)s Jane ? s Fighting Ships, 1965-1966 (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965), p, 324,
U,S. ? Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appro-
priations, Hearings on the Department: of Defense Appropriations for
196 7
,
89th Cong., 2nd Sess,
? 1966, Part 1, p, 151,""
Naval Aviation News, June, 1966, p, 28.

designed to operate 130 aircraft in World War II are limited to
some 80 of the current models at the same percentage utilization
of available parking space , The increased ordnance and fuel con-
sumption rates require greatly increased storage and handling
2
capacity, or more frequent replenishment,
The Navy Department is concerned with plans for replacement of
its outmoded capital equipment, just as the production manager of
the Edge-Ring Division was. The older B=machines (carriers) can-
not operate efficiently with modern fighters and attack aircraft
(the A. .)• As demand increases, the older machines simply cannot
maintain the pace, There is no question of usefulness of the equip-
ment, but rather whether there is a more efficient use of the scarce
resources available,
A replacement schedule for the HANCOCK- class attack carriers
has been established. It calls for retirement of one in fiscal
year 1969, when the JOHN F. KENNEDY (CVA-67) joins the fleet, and
one more by end fiscal year 19 70, when the MIDWAY-class moderniza-
tion will be completed. The remaining three will be retired as new
construction is delivered, starting with the approved fiscal year
31967 nuclear carrier, Under the assumption of additional




U.S., Congress, House, Hearings , 1966, p. 581,
3
This carrier is a new design, essentially an AMERICA-class
ship with a two-reactor nuclear power plant, It is sometimes
referred to as the C7AN-2E, for "Nuclear Attack Carrier, 2-reactor,
Enterprise hull," or by its hull number, CVAN-68,

construction of two more nuclear carriers of the same class at two-
year intervals, the replacement plan would appear as outlined in
Table 3 at the end of this chapter. Note that replacement of the
MIDWAY-class, which should begin shortly after retirement of the
last HANCOCK-class ship, has been omitted. The modernization program
being undertaken will extend the life of this class into the 1980' s;
therefore they can be considered a constant element of the force for
this analysis.
The question of whether this planned replacement schedule is
optimal leads to the following
HYPOTHESIS: The remaining HANCOCK-class attack carriers
can be retired earlier than currently planned.
Cost savings will more than offset expenditures
for early replacement
.
Early replacement implies an accelerated building schedule.
While it is technically possible to construct up to three carriers
simultaneously in U. S, shipyards, the manpower limitations which
exist in the military services today would prevent the manning of
all these ships with their initial crews at the same time. Second,
construction cannot begin until the Congress appropriates the funds,
an annual process. Third, it is more expensive to build more than
two carriers simultaneously than sequentially, in part because the
available ways can hold just two at one time. Adding more ways
or contracting with another shipyard would add to the cost, Taking
these considerations into account resulted in selecting the alter-
natives listed in Tatle 3 as feasible alternatives to the basic plan.

The new construction is currently planned as nuclear power.
Alternative One would substitute conventional power for the two
additional carriers, while Alternative Two retains nuclear power;
both are on an accelerated building schedule , The alternatives
are hypothetical, of course; they are selected to expose the sensi-
tivity of the hypothesis to the assumptions made. Both alterna-
tives involve early replacement of the last two HANCOCK-class
,
and will result in force differences, especially in the 1973-1975
period
,
The alternatives outlined provide a total of three different
ways to accomplish the same goal, modernization of the attack
carrier striking force. Each of these alternatives must be
carefully analyzed before any conclusions can be drawn regarding
their relative value, The same factors which affect the Edge-
Ring's replacement schedule enter here; budget constraints, effec-
tiveness in competition with potential opponents, and cost impli-
cations of differing time schedules. An. analytical model will be
constructed in the next chapter in order to perform the comparison.

TABLE 1
ATTACK CARRIER STRIKING FORCES
Hull
Number Name Commissioned Air Wing
CVA 14 Ticonderoga 1944 CVW 5
CVA 19 Hancock" 1944 CVW 21
CVA 31 Bon Homme Richard 1944 CVW 19
CVA 34 Oriskany 1950 CVW 16
CVA 38 Shangri La 1944 CVW 10
CVA 41 Midway*'' 1945 Out of Commis-
sion--Shipyard
Overhaul
CVA 42 Franklin D. Roosevelt 1945 CVW 1
CVA 43 Coral Sea 1947 CVW 15
CVA 59 Forrestal* 1955 CVW 8
CVA 60 Saratoga 1956 CVW 3
CVA 61 Ranger 1957 CVW 2
CVA 62 Independence 1959 CVW 7
CVA 63 Kitty Hawk* 1961 CVW 11
CVA 64 Constellation 1962 CVW 14
CVA 66 America" 1965 CVW 6
CVA 67 John F. Kennedy — - Under
Construction
CVAN 65 Enterprise" 1963 CVW 9
RCVW 4, 12
"Legend and note on page 10
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CVAN Attack Carrier, Nuclear Power
CVW Attack Carrier Air Wing
RCVW Attack Carrier Air Wing, Refresher Training
Midway" Asterisk indicates class-name ship
Air wing-ship assignments are not fixed, but vary with
deployment and overhaul schedules
.
Source: Jane T s Fighting Ships 1965-1966
, 1965, pp. 319-324;






ATTACK CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT'
Model Crew Weight Dimensions Power Plant Speed Remarks
Span Length
ATTACK





3 70,000 72' 6" 75 T 9" J57-P-10 (2) 650 Del 195 7
A-
4
1 17,500 27 , 6" 41 T 4 TT J52-P-8 (1) 700 A-4F 1966
A-
6
2 38,750 53' 53'3 ,T J52-P-6 (2) 650 Del 1961
A-
7
1 33,000 38' 46 T TF30-P-6 (1) 700 Del 1966
FIGHTER
F-4 2 45,000 38 T 5" 58'3 Tt J79-GE-8 (2) M2+ Del 1959
F-8 1 25,500 35 '8" 54 , 6" J57-P-20 (1) M2 Del 1960
Mod 1966
F-111B 2 68,000 70 f 67 T TF30-P-3 (2) M2.5 Del 19 70
FECONNAISSANCE - ECM
RF-4 2 45,000 38 T 5 TT 58 T 3" J79-GE-8 (2) M2 + Del 1965
RF-8G 1 24,400 35' 8" 55 T 3" J57-P-20 (1) M2 Mod RF-8?
Del 1966
RA-^C 2 76,500 53' 76 T 6" J79-GE-8 (2) M2 Del 1964
EA-6 2 38,750 53' 53'3 TT J52-P-6 (2) 650 Del 1966
WARNING
E-l 4 26,966 72' 4" 45' 4" R-1820-82WA
(2)
250 Del 1958
E-2 5 49,500 80 T 7" 56'4" T56-A-8 (2) 300 Del 1964
TABLE 2 - Continued on next page.
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TABLE 2 - Continued
Model Crew Weight Dimensions Power Plant Speed Remarks
Span Length
ASW - RESCUE
SH-3D 4 17,300 1-62' 54 T 9" T58-GE-8 (2) 200 Del 1965
Helo
UTILITY
C-2 2(40) 49,500 80' 7" 56' 4" T56-A-8 (2) 300 Del 1965
Transport
James C. Fahey (ed.), The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S.






CLASS 1968 1969 1970 19 71 19 72
Current Plan
HANCOCK 5 4 4 3 2
MIDWAY 2 2 2 3 3
FORRESTAL 4 4 4 4 4
AMERICA 3 4 4 4 4
ENTERPRISE 1 1 1 1 1
CVAN-2E 1




Alternative No. 2 (changes only)
HANCOCK
CVAN-2E
TABLE 3 - Continued
14
19 73 19 74 19 75 19 76 1977 19 78 19 79 1980
2 1 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
-1 -1 -1
+1 +2 +2 +2 +2 +2 +2 +2






A chapter on methodology should logically begin by making it
clear just what we are trying to accomplish, We are confronted
with a sv_ ~em, the Attack Carrier Striking Force. Our goal is to
analyze the effects of changes in the system; hence the term
system analysis.
The purpose of the analysis is to assist in somehow maximi-
zing a return on our investment, or alternatively, minimizing the
cost of obtaining a specified return. As such, it is imbedded in
a spectrum of analytic techniques, ranging from the classical
theory of a firm attempting to maximize profits—the difference
between a discounted stream of revenues and a discounted stream of
costs--to the field of pure operations research, where the attempt
is to obtain maximum effectiveness from a specific set of resources
The profit maximization problem can be expressed entirely in
terms of dollars, while operations research has no limitations on
the unit of measure , Between these limits lies the system analysis
or, more precisely, cost-effectiveness analysis with which we are
concerned.
Military cost-effectiveness analysis is not a decision rule,
but an economic tjoo1 designed to reduce the level of uncertainty
in the final decision. The decision maker is assumed to be knowl-




of the specific question, he would be capable of making some sort
of decision without the analysis, based on his past experience.
But the more he knows about the problem, especially about the costs
involved, the better will be his decision.
,T A cost analyst operates on the simple faith that
a decision maker will make a better decision if he is
aware of the costs of his action, regardless of what kind
of analysis or professional judgment supports the decision.
Such faith has gone a long way; the time-phased display of
weapon systems and costs by major mission has probably been
the most important change in management techniques made by
the present Administration, I am still surprised how many
problems are solved by knowing the costs of the alterna-
tives, how many dominant cases are apparent, how many
arguments over specifications and policies are apparently
irrelevant. An awareness of costs also shapes the program
review and study process by focusing attention on the areas
of major resource commitment , ,T 1
The analysis itself contains five essential elements:
1. An objective to be performed.
2. Alternative ways to meet the objective.
3. Resource costs of the alternatives,
4. A model relating 1, 2, and 3,
2
5. A criterion for choosing the preferred alternative.
The objective of the Attack Carrier Striking Force is set out
in its mission, quoted in Chapter I. There are a number of tasks
which may be performed in carrying out that mission, and each
alternative considered must be capable of accomplishing each of
these tasks.
Address by William A, Niskanen, Jr., Director of Special
Studies, Office of the Assistant Secretary (Comptroller), Depart-
ment of Defense to the Joint Conference of the Canadian Operations
Research Society and the Operations Research Society of America;
Montreal, Canada: May 28, 1964,
See, e.g.. Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the
Nuclear Age (New York: Atheneum, 1965), Chapter 7,
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The alternatives selected are variations in time-phasing of
essentially the same force structure. There are probably a great
many other ways to meet the stated objective, some of them com-
petitive under certain conditions. An example would be the
Tactical Air Forces of the United States Air Force. The tasks of
interdiction, air superiority, and close air support are common to
both forces. Studies of the most efficient mix between these
forces are appropriate tasks for systems analysts, but are ad-
dressed to a decision level higher than that of this paper.
Resource costs of the alternatives are all those costs
chargeable to the alternatives. These are not just the cost of
the hardware to be purchased, but the total systems cost of buying
hardware and support equipment, training and supplying personnel
to operate the system, the annual costs of operating and repairing
the equipment, and the costs of replacement of destroyed or over-
age items, The length of the planning period selected is seen
to be an important factor in the costing. It affects the operating
costs, of course; but at the end of the period the remaining use-
ful life of the system must be accounted for. An allowance for
salvage value of the equipment, expressed as the present value in
its next best use (its "opportunity cost", in economic terms) must
be subtracted from the total. This salvage value may in fact be
just the cost of replacing the equipment with another one of the
same type, In any event, care must be taken to ensure that such
items as remain in the inventory at the end of the planning period
do in fact retain a military worth or effectiveness at that time

18
before assigning a value; prediction of the state of the art and
of the need for a system in the future is fraught with uncertain-
ties and the chance of statistical error.
Considerable effort has been put into solution of the pro-
blems of costs and of investment policies for equipment subject
1
to replacement. The particular cost technique selected must be
tailored to the scope of the study, the available data, and the
time and manpower constraints of the study groups. Inaccurate
or unsupportable predictions may be worse than useless; they
may reinforce decisions which might better have not been made
at all.
A model of the problem is basically an abstraction of the
real world designed to cope with the myriad variables inherent
in any system in such a way that only those variables especially
relevant to the decision at issue need be considered.
Models may take a number of forms, from simple graphs to
complex equations to a full-scale maneuver of actual forces, The
[ irpose is to simulate real or expected conditions in such a way
that the outcome predicted by the model will have some validity
when applied to the real world system.
One very important part of any economic analysis, and partic-
ularly of any military cost-effectiveness analysis, is the exami-
nation of the effects of allowing other factors to vary. The
A, Reism.an, and E, S, Buffa, "A General Model for Investme]
Policy," agement Science, VIII (196:), pp , 304-310,
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sensitivity of the results to variations in the factors assumed
constant give some indication of the consequences of a poor
prediction, or a wrong choice. The major effect of sensitivity
analyses is to reduce the level of uncertainty for the decision
maker.
With the objective in hand, the alternatives and their costs
defined, and a model constructed and tested for sensitivity, the
system is ready for evaluation. But that evaluation must be
measured against some sort of standard; what is needed is a cri-
terion or measure of effectiveness, a term usually abbreviated to
MOE, The choice of the MOE is critical to the outcome, An inter-
esting commentary on the subject of choosing appropriate measures
of the effectiveness of a system was delivered at a Symposium on
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis sponsored by the Washington Operations
Research Council in Washington, D, C, on 14 June 1965:
TT
. . . The choice of these measures is the most
difficult unique problem of cost-effectiveness analysis.
The appropriate measure should have two characteristics:
First, and most important, it must be relevant; preferably,
but less important, it must be measurable. These objectives
are often conflicting. The most relevant are often very
difficult to measure and vice versa. The analyst's first
challenge, therefore, is to choose a better combination of
relevance and arithmetic than that exhibited by most politi-
cal strategists, and, for that matter, by all too many
operations analysts,
Let me give you some examples of the problems in
choosing proxy measures and the effects of maximizing on
such proxy measures. You are probably familiar with the
story about the manager of the Soviet nail factory, who was
initially given a measure of merit for his output in terms
of the total weight of the output of his establishment.
Like a good bureaucrat, he maximized on this explicitly
:ated objective and turned out only huge railroad spikes,
A? a result of having a surplus of railroad spikes, his
objective function was changed to maximize the total number

20
of nails he produced. In a very short time, he was able
to switch over to complete production of brads, tacks, and
staples. Because the Soviets have chosen not to evaluate
their output by market criteria, they try to define the
measure of effectiveness for a particular establishment in
some physical terms. In this example, maximizing on these
physical terms led to an activity which was inconsistent
with the interests of the higher level decision makers.
The construction of Federal buildings presents the
same problem. The contracts for most Federal buildings
are let on a fixed price, competitive bid basis, pri-
marily on the basis of cost per square foot. As a re-
sult, this has led to prison-like structures, with
minimal outside window space and huge rooms inside--a
generally depressing environment. One of the most inter-
esting, not to say timely, expressions of this problem
was formulated about 120 years ago by Jeremy Bentham, the
English utilitarian. He wrote a short essay on what he
considered to be the optimal prison, and included a draw-
ing to illustrate his conclusion. This prison has 5 sides,
it is 5 stories high, and has an inner courtyard!"!
Before any criteria can be applied to competing alternative
systems, the systems must somehow be set equal. Clearly, in
terms of cost-effectiveness, if two alternatives are equal in
cost, then that which is more effective is the preferred alter-
native, Equally acceptable is the less costly of two alternatives
equal in effectiveness. If two alternatives exhibit both different
costs and different levels of effectiveness, we have no basis
from which to judge; or, rather, we have too many bases for
judgment, The purpose of the analysis is to reduce the uncer-
tainty for the decision maker; therefore equality must exist in
one or the other.
William A. Niskanen, Jr., U. S. National Security Objectives
and The Choice_of_Measures of Efre^tTveness (Interna
1
"Note N-30(R)
Economic and Political Studies Divi"sToh, "Institute for Defense
Analyses, Arlington, Va„, 1965), pp. 4-5.
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The mission of the attack carrier striking forces is a
single one, but it is multi-dimensional. Because of the diffi-
culties in defining effectiveness adequately, and of measuring
the effectiveness once defined, as well as the sensitivity of
the results to the situations and world events postulated, the
equal-effectiveness method is somewhat less preferable. On the
other hand, costs are at least transformable to a single dimen-
sion. In addition, costs are expressed in units familiar to
laymen, and the implications of a dollar spent or saved are
easily grasped. The evaluation of the resulting level of effec-
tiveness for each alternative is left, in part, to the decision
maker. Our assumption that the decision maker is knowledgeable
in the military aspects of the problem merely serves to reinforce
the choice of equal-cost alternatives
.
One danger in equal-costing is that a given alternative may
be forced to operate at a level less than "optimal" for its
structure. If one alternative is more expensive, but exhibits
greater effectiveness, it may well be that the sacrifice of
effectiveness caused by reducing its cost to equal that of the
other alternatives may cause it to become less preferable. One
way around this possibility is to examine the effects of in-
creasing the cost of the other alternatives and the resulting
effectiveness, In a crude manner, this amounts to taking the
first derivative of the alternatives with respect to effective-
ness and examining their slopes; it is the marginal effective-
ness at the force level postulated,
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An example will serve to illustrate; in Figure 2, the costs
of two alternatives are plotted as a function of effectiveness.
For each system, both marginal costs (MC) and average costs- (AC)
are plotted. Just as in a firm, the optimum level of performance
occurs where MC-AC, and if the price (demand) is suitable, this
is the desired (effectiveness) level. For any other demand, the
most favorable position to operate is on the MC curve. This, in
effect, forms the supply curve for the system. Clearly, at the
optimum level of performance for system A, represented by C on
the ordinate, system B suffers in an equal-cost comparison, while
the reverse is true at C, . The decision on which system is f'best ?T
is a function of the overall effectiveness level (demand) to be
maintained during the period in question.
Another factor to be kept in mind is future changes in force
retirements. If E Tr. happened to be satisfactory for the planningAu
period under study, system A would be preferred. On the other
d , if conditions were such that a growth capability to some
le-ei beyond E. p was anticipated as a future requirement, and if
:em B had a significant useful life remaining at that time, its
selection would be preferred. Here, the choice of the length of
the planning period enters as an imports 'ariable. Although the
selection of a period for study is sometimes dictated by factors
outside the study, it is more often arbitrary; in either case the






















Figure 2b illustrates another possible outcome. Here,
System A displays greater effectiveness at every cost level up
to the optimum for System B; even at this level, effectiveness is
equal. The importance of the location of the demand curve and the
future requirement beyond the planning period under consideration
are now the controlling factors, It may well be that additional
study in an attempt to predict demand will be required before a
decision can be made. This sort of result is precisely what the
present study is designed to do. If it correctly illustrates the
consequences of any decision for the decision-maker, it helps him
either make up his mind on an alternative, or decide to seek more
data before coming to any conclusion about the alternatives, It
has served to reduce the uncertainty for him, and illuminate other
factors which affect the choice.
For the hypothesis of this paper we are given the objective,
the assigned mission of the Attack Carrier Striking Force. Three
alternatives have been postulated, designed to examine the impli=
cations of a number of factors, principally the time-phasing of
replacement of the HANCOCK-class
.
Costs of the alternatives will be expressed primarily in
terms of marginal costs; that is,, the difference in costs between
the basic plan and the two alternatives , Since each alternative
is a time-phased plan, and comparison will be made on an equal-
cost basis, the costs will differ from year to year in each case
will sum to zero when totaled for the alternative.
Cost of the basic plan will be computed as a reference mark,
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The alternatives will first be assembled at their optimal level,
then adjusted in force level to arrive at equal-cost conditions,
Since the adjustment in cost affects the effectiveness of
the force, the cost adjustment will be made by varying the number
of strike aircraft: purchased. The planned air wing composition
is set up in order to optimize the effectiveness of each carrier;
therefore a different number of strike aircraft will result in
operation at some level less than optimum. This is a result of
the congestion on the flight deck; with a greater number of air-
craft on board 3 refueling and rearming take more time, Moving
parked aircraft to allow launch and recovery operations also
increases the time between successive launches. The total result
is a somewhat reduced strike capability fo r each indiyidual air •-
craft. In the same manner, reduced deck load contributes to an
incre-i.se in strike capability for each aircraft, but a smaller
total capability of the whole force. In short, the force will not
be operating at its optimum level. To test the marginal effect of
performance away from optimum levels, additional adjustments will
be made to bring all three alternatives to equal cost at each of
the three cost levels
„
The actual costs will be a time-phased stream of costs, in-
cluding investment, training, operation and maintenance, and a
salvage value at the end of the period. Details are covered in
Chapter TIT, These are peacetime costs, since the purpose of
the paper i- to study the peacetime cost of providing wartime
effectiveness in performing the assigned mission.
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The additional wartime costs of any specific contingency
will tend to be of minor concern. For example, it is estimated
that the cost of United States forces in Korea over and above
the normal cost of such forces if no action was taking place was
approximately five billion dollars in the fiscal year 1951/52,
about 11 percent of total United States expenditures for major
national security programs that year.
The implications of the timing of the alternatives will be
examined bv discounting the time-phased stream and collapsing the




[l]n the case of the cost streams, even though
costs are incurred at different times in the future, they
can be weighted, summed, and reduced to single cost co-
efficients for each system. This is because a measure-
ment of time preference is available which allows the
annual increments of costs to be added. This is the pre-
ference of the economy for a dollar today versus a dollar
tomorrow. In slightly different terms, the analyst weights
future expenditures according to the time preference of
the economy for command over resources -- the things
dollars can buy -- in the near future versus command over
resources at some later date. This time preference is ex-
pressed by the rate of interest that must be paid on
borrowed funds. Such funds allow one to obtain command
over resources now rather than at some future time. The
technique used to weight and then sum the cost streams is
known as discounting, "2
Discounting for military expenditures is a measure of the
relative importance of the system being purchased over the systems,
either similar or dissimilar, which must be postponed or sacrificed
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings
,
82nd. Cong,, 2nd Sess., 1952, p. 359.
James G. Abert, "Structuring Cost Effectiveness Analyses,"
Logistics Review and Military Logistics Journal, Vol. II, No, 7,
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in order to pay for the alternative. This will always be true
under a budget constraint 3 even though the natural forces of
supply and demand which exist in the private sector do not
operate in the military environment to force restraint on
expenditures.
Discounting is applied by using the function such that the
th 1








P.V. = S , where (n+1) - number of years
i=o (1+r)
covered in the study, and C. is the cost in the i year,
One assumption over which a great deal of controversy exists
is the rate at which expenditures are discounted. The rate is a
function of the interest rate in the private sector 3 since the
alternative allocation of the defense dollar is to the private
sector. For most purposes a rate of 10%, representing a reason-
able marginal rate of return before taxes on capital in the pri-
vate sector may be used, Sensitivity to the rate will be tested
by using two other rates as well; zero and 15%, It is impractical
to assign a rate much higher than 15% for useful evaluation,
"Another question concerns discounting cost streams
"to take account of risk". Loading the discount rate with
a factor ' T for risk" is quite perverse if it is intended
to correct for doubts about the relative cost estimates in
the systems studied
,
This is shown by considering two estimated cost
streams for producing a given effectiveness, Suppose we
know from empirical evidence that cost estimates for the
farther-future become less reliable. Applying a discount
rate to streams of single-valued., annual cost estimates
reduces remote costs more than early costs, The discounted
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operation thereby biases choice toward projects with
relatively large later cost estimates, the more uncertain
alternatives. The bias would be still stronger if an attempt
is made to account for differential estimating reliability
among entire streams by discounting riskier cost streams at
higher rates . "1
The model to be used is the force structure planned for the
1968-1980 period. It includes the carriers and their air wings,
plus escorts and support (underway replenishment) ships. The
forces will be set up in the costing process , then exercised in a
postulated conflict situation to evaluate their effectiveness, as
measured by the criterion selected. The model itself is an abstrac-
tion from reality., since a number of assumptions must be made and
adhered to for the evaluation. It was pointed out earlier that the
real world force is affected by so many variables that an attempt
to take them all into account would lead to endless frustration
and the high probability that the problem would have occurred long
before the solution was obtained. The intent is to draw a set of
boundary lines around the problem in such a way that what is left
inside is still free to vary, but to an extent which can be ana-
lyzed and reported on within the limitations of the student's time
and knowledge. The primary assumptions are:
1. Basic replacement schedule will be one new CVAN-2E every
two years, starting in 196 7. This assumption was discussed in
Chapter I
.
2. Only AMERTCA-class and CVAN-2E class carriers will be
constructed. It is known that at least one new design for a
N. V. Breckner and J. W. Noah, Cost ':ems Analysis,
CNA Research Contribution No, 21, (WasTT : .T7: Center "for
Naval Analyses, The Franklin Institute, 1966), pp, 10-11.
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carrier is being proposed, but the examination of all possible
designs would extend the scope of the analysis beyond its intended
boundaries,
3. The MIDWAY-class will be operated throughout the study
period without replacement. The extension of the MIDWAY-class
into the 1980 period was discussed in Chapter I,
4. The force level will remain at 15 carriers in commission
and I 7 air wings. The Secretary of Defense force structure pro-
posals have fluctuated in the past
? down to 13 carriers in 1965,
His proposals for the immediate future call for a reduction in the
number of air wings compared with the number of attack carriers.
This is proposed partly because a carrier in overhaul cannot oper-
ate with its air wing, and this wing is thus free to operate with
other carriers. Because the effectiveness scenarios postulated
would be complicated by their timing with respect to the carrier
overhaul schedule, and because predictions about the need for
attack carrier striking forces, and therefore their structure in
1.980 are almost impossible in 1966, the existing structure will be
retained. Uncertainty about requirements as a result of current
operations in Southeast Asia contributes to the decision to hold
force level constant
.
5. Only aircraft now in existence or under development will
be considered. It is recognized that several of the aircraft now
in use will ultimately be replaced by new designs which have not
U. S., Congress, House, Hearings , 1966, p, 150,
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yet progressed to the drawing board. In order to analyze the
question posed, an air wing must be placed aboard each ship, and
its effectiveness evaluated. The effect of using current designs
is twofold; first, costs are known or can be reasonably forecast.
Second, performance data is available from which effectiveness of
the alternatives can be calculated. Increases in cost for newer
designs would certainly be accompanied by increases in effective-
ness, but the trend should be evenly spread throughout the force,
so that relative ranking of the alternatives would not vary.
6. 1966 Costs are assumed for the planning period. Estimates
of all factors; investment, operations, maintenance, training, etc.
have been made for the current year. The assumption is that cost
trends and/or inflation will magnify the size of the total sys-
tems cost, but will affect each of the alternatives equally. The
sensitivity test of the discount rate would have a similar effect
as applying price trend factors to each year's expenditures,
although the effects on total cost of increasing discount rate
and increasing price trend are opposite,
7. Technology will be held constant. This assumption relates
back to ship and aircraft designs, as well as the possiblity of
developing a completely new substitute for the whole force, This
assumption affects aircraft costs most significantly, because the
observed effect in the past is that aircraft unit investment costs
would decline as total quantity purchased increases, but continual
improvement in the design of the aircraft and changes in the in-
stalled equipment force a growth in price instead . Forcasting
future inventions is almost as hazardous as forecasting future peace
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and prosperity; therefore the world of 1966 will be chosen in-
stead
.
The measure of effectiveness to be used to evaluate the alter-
natives is difficult to specify. Carrier aircraft can perform a
variety of missions, from nuclear attack to recovery of astronauts;
no single measure can adequately cover all tasks . On the other
hand, attack carrier striking forces exist to project our striking
power to wherever it is needed. Viewed in this light, the func-
tions of air defense, anti-submarine defense, rescue, etc. serve
to support and maintain the capability to deliver strike ordnance
where it is needed. The mobility of the force is used to transit
to the area of conflict, to assist in presenting a more difficult
target for the enemy, and to allow replenishment to be conducted
away from the area of battle. It seems logical, therefore, to
select the total weapon delivery capability of the force as the
primary measure of effectiveness. This will be defined as the
total delivery capability available to a theater command through-
out the course of a postulated war situation. In this way, the
effects of mobility, response time, and defense capability while
operating can be measured in terms of their contribution to the
primary MOE. Support ship requirements will also be calculated
as a chargeable item for each alternative.
Since the MOE is extremely sensitive to the location and
duration of the conflict, two separate scenarios are postulated,
with different characteristics. The implications of the difference
in scenarios, plus additional variations used to test sensitivity,
are discussed in Chapter IV.

32
In summary, then, we have defined the objective and selected
the alternative. A number of critical assumptions have been made
about the model, and significant sensitivity tests outlined for
each step of the analysis. The following two chapters will discuss





Actual force structures and cost estimates are classified.
This chapter will describe the analysis technique,, using unclassi-
fied data or hypothetical examples to illustrate the procedure.
There are six steps in the cost analysis. They are:
1. A determination is made of the time-phased inventory of
tactical aircraft and ships the Navy will have in the 1968-1980
period 3 applying the assumptions of Chapter II.
2. By the same process, the time-phased inventories of
Alternatives 1 and 2 are determined.
3. The total-systems cost of the basic plan is estimated.
4. Cost differences (marginal costs) for Alternatives 1 and
2 are derived and summed.
5. Adjustments are made to the force structures of the
three alternatives to arrive at a set of equal-cost alternatives.
6. A sensitivity analysis is performed.
Each of these steps will be described in turn. The application of
the technique to the classified problem is shown in Appendix B.
COST ESTIMATION
One problem with cost estimation is that the term means
different things to different people; in particular s it means
much more to an economist analyzing the effect of buying or not




who happens to be concerned with the actual purchase only. The
economist is concerned with this, of course; but beyond the
purchase lies the years of service; the direct charges which can
be assigned for its operation and repair; pay of the operators of
the machine; and indirectly, the share of the cost of running the
"front office," which is necessary if the machine is to perform
at all. These last, the overhead costs, are extremely difficult
to assign on any systematic basis. It is clear, of course, that
there is considerable room for disagreement over any estimate of
cost, regardless of its source or intended purpose. For the
analysis at hand, it is important to the extent that the esti-
mates arrived at effectively represent the relative cost of the
alternatives being examined, not the total figure it might add
up to
.
The cost estimate for any single ship or type of aircraft in
the force structure is a time-phased stream of annual expenditures
over the period 1968-1980, and consists of investment, annual
operating costs, and a salvage value in 1980. Investment in-
cludes initial purchase and outfitting as well as ship overhaul
costs occurring during the year of overhaul. Annual operating costs
cover fuel and ammunition expenditures, plus such items as over-
haul allowance, spare parts and special equipment, pay and allow-
ances for the crew, replacement crew training, etc. The salvage
value of a ship or aircraft is calculated on the basis of expected
J. Maurice Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs
,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1923), Chapter III, et al
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remaining useful life, and is expressed as a percentage of the
cost of purchasing an identical replacement. Point estimates of
all costs are used, expressed in 1966 dollars. No attempt is made
to forecast trends, or to estimate a confidence interval for future
expenditures
.
Costs are expressed using the Total Obligational Authority
method; that is, authorized expenditures are assumed to be made in
that same year, even thought actual disbursements may occur over
a period of several years, Sensitivity tests carried out in a
similar study showed no change in relative ranking of the alter-
natives considered when cash flow was substituted for TOA.
Ship Costs. Primary source of ship cost data is the Navy
Program Factor Book, OPNAV 90P-02, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL). Estimates
in this book are average annual cost estimates, based on historical
data for each ship class, adjusted to be valid for "Five Year Force
Structure and Financial Planning" purposes. As such, they are
the best available estimates for costs through 1971. Initial con-
struction cost estimates are available for a number of ship classes,
Both lead-ship and follow-on ship costs are provided, The cost of
a lead-ship, the first of a new class or new design, is greater
than that of subsequent ships because of such charges as those
for building plans and specifications, and because of learning
effects.
Naval Warfare Analysis Group Study No. 42, Tactical Air War -
fare Study I I (U ), Vol. II: Cost Analysis, (Arlington, Va.: Center
ToF Naval Analyses, The Franklin Institute, 1965), (SECRET) p, 27,





Ship conversion and overhaul costs represent the cost of
shipyard labor, material, and overhaul expenses required to accom-
plish repairs during a scheduled overhaul period. In general,
conversion is in addition to regular overhaul costs, and normally
provides modernization and improvements in the ship's cababilities
.
Annual operating costs include both direct and indirect
charges against the ship. These include:
Direct Charg e
s
1. Ship's personnel pay and allowances.
2. Non-scheduled repairs.
3. Supplies and equipage.
4. Fuel and Utilities. The average annual share of the






Charges for a pro-rata share of the
facilities ashore which contribute to the operation of the ship
and its crew, and which can be accurately identified,
1. Training support personnel.
2. Other support personnel,
3. Personnel general expenses.
4. Supply support.
5. Medical care.




Salvage value of the ship at the end of the planning period
was calculated as a savings equal to the fraction of years' life
remaining in first-line service divided by the standard service
life of the ship, multiplied by the cost of constructing an
identical replacement. Since the next-best use of the CVA is
employment as an anti-submarine carrier, (CVS), the opportunity
cost of the CVA involves the cost of constructing the same ship
for use as a CVS. No major conversion is necessary to use the
ship as either CVA or CVS. For lead-ships, follow-on replacement
costs are used.
Cost estimates for a hypothetical ship are given in Table 4.
Aircraft Costs
.
Aircraft operating costs are obtained from
the Navy Program Factors Book previously mentioned. However, air-
craft investment costs are highly sensitive to the total quantity
purchased. The unit investment cost for a single aircraft in-
cludes the "flyaway cost" of the airframe, engines, electronics,
armament, and other government furnished equipment, plus a cost
factor (percent of flyaway cost) for spares, repair parts, special
support equipment such as aircraft computer check-out equipment,
and training equipment. This last factor includes the electronic
flight simulators used extensively in ground training flight
crews for their tactical mission.
Aircraft production costs also exhibit a "learning curve"
effect; as more airframes are purchased, unit airframe costs tend
to decline. This effect is sometimes masked by design improvements




COST ESTIMATE FOR USS HYPOTHET (CVAN-99).
(Dollars in Millions)
Construction (SCN)
Initial Missile Fill (PAMN)
Total
Overhaul (O/H)












































Salvage = =* x $310.0 = $217.0
Note that discounting initially reduces the effect of salvage
on the total, but as the rate rises, it will reduce the entire cost
stream to a smaller total than the 0% rate.
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cost of improved design and newer, more effective electronics
and/or armament may cause the actual unit cost to increase.
One of the assumptions made in Chapter II is that technology
will be held constant for the duration of the planning period. If
this is the case, then learning curves can be estimated using pub-
lished sources and an estimating technique based on historical
cost data of conventional fixed wing aircraft.
By use of a double-log transformation on the relationship be-
tween cost and resource requirements as a function of aircraft
weight, speed, engine thrust, production rates, and production
quantities, a series of curves have been estimated for unit in-
vestment costs as a function of total quantity purchased. The
curves developed in the reference cited were used for the analysis
with two additions, A-4 and the F-8/RF-8. Since the latter two
aircraft have been in the inventory for a number of years, the
cost of the current modernization program was charged as initial
investment cost. The aircraft is considered to have a full first-
2line service life remaining on completion of the rework.
Cost estimates using the learning curve were obtained as
follows: the Air Wing utilization and planned replacement schedule
provided the quantity required for any specific purchase. One-half
this amount was added to the total number of that type aircraft




June 1966, p. 28; and Program Change
Proposal, TT Modi fieat ion of F-8 B/C/D/E Aircraft", 1965, approved
by Secretary of Defense Memorandum of 25 April, 1966 (SECRET).
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already purchased to date, obtained from the Naval Aviation
Summary, 1 April 1966. (SECRET). The learning curve for the air-
craft was then entered at that quantity on the ordinate, and the
unit investment cost for that buy determined.
Annual operating costs for each aircraft were calculated from
data in the Navy Program Factors Book
,
applying average annual flying
hours to the cost per flying hour given there. Direct and indirect
charges closely parallel those for ship operating costs.
A time-stream of cost-calculations for a hypothetical air-
craft, the A-8, is given in Table 5.
The cost estimate for the basic plan is computed by adding the
estimate for each ship and aircraft type included in the force
structure determined.
Cost estimates for Alternatives 1 and 2 are computed by summing
the marginal cost differences between the basic plan and the alter-
native for each year. It is immediately clear that the three alter-
natives do not have equal costs, since each force structure was set
at its optimal level independently of the other two alternatives.
FORCE STRUCTURE
The carrier force structures to be employed are listed in Table
3, Note that a total of six different ship classes are included in
the analysis.
Since the ships have comparable deck space, the air wing for
the CVAN-2E-class will be the same as that used on the ENTERPRISE,
CVAN-55. This will result in five different classes of carriers,














Initial Buy (From Table 6)
v 2
+ (First Purchase)






Annual Operating Cost (Including Overhaul) $ .80 per aircraft
Operating Cost $.80 X 288 = $230.4
Year 1973 1974 1975 19 76 1977 19 78 19 79 1980
Item INV O&M O&M O&M O&M O&M O&M O&M
Cost 162.0 230.4 230.4 230.4 230.4 230.4 230.4 230.4
SALVAGE = (Airframe seven years old in 1980)
TOTAL COST












The actual air wing capacity of any specific ship depends on
the available deck space (including hangar deck) for parking, and
on aircraft dimensions. It is quite clear that enough space must
be retained on the flight deck to allow launching and recovery of
aircraft. Normally the aircraft are moved aft during launch, and
occupy the landing area space. After the launch is complete, re-
maining aircraft in the landing area must be moved forward, or
outside the designated landing area (bounded by a "foul line"
along its edges) before recovery of aircraft can be started. This
delay caused by moving aircraft : back and forth contributes to the
"cycle time" of the ship, or the time between successive launches
of groups of aircraft. The time for refueling and rearming returned
aircraft is in addition to this "re-spot" time.
Available parking space aboard any carrier can be conveniently
expressed in terms of a unit quantity of space. A convenient unit
is the area (in square feet) covered by a single A-4 aircraft. The
area covered by other carrier aircraft may then be expressed as the
ratio of:
Area covered by airplane X (wings folded) .
Area covered by one A-4
Using a table of deck spotting factors for the various types
of aircraft together with the available parking space on a carrier
expressed in the same units, a planned load of aircraft can be con-
structed for that ship. For example, assume that a given carrier
has room for ISO A-4 aircraft, allowing the minimum space for launch
and recovery. Since the peacetime deck load is somewhat less
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because the air wings are somewhat smaller, assume that all carriers
are loaded to 2/3 capacity. With a hypothetical set of aircraft, a
auitable air wing would consist of the following:
Carrier Air Wing Composition
Full Load 2/3 Load
Carrier X 150 100
A/C No. X Spot Factor = Total deck spot
F-13 12 x 1.8 = 21.6
A-
4
28 x 1.0 = 28.0
A-
8
14 x 1.3 = 18.2
RF-13 5 x 1.8 = 9.0
E-3 5 x 2.6 = 13,0
H-l 6 x .9 = 5.4
C-2 1 X 2.5 = 2.5
Total 97.7
As new aircraft are introduced into the fleet, with different
spot factors, the air wing composition will change. Since the newer
aircraft generally display increased effectiveness, the ship and its
air wing will display a different level of effectiveness. An in-
crease or decrease in effectiveness could be attained, depending on
the changes of spot factors and effectiveness relative to each other :
Current objective plans have been used to determine air wing
compositions for the 1968-1980 period. Only aircraft listed in
Chief of Naval Operations memorandum 00214P05, Navy Objective
CVA Air Wing (U), 10 June 1966 (SECRET).
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Table 2 were used, keeping the deck spot percentage essentially at
the same value for each carrier class.
The total number of aircraft purchased is greater than the
number required to equip each air wing. Allowances must be made
for training crews, overhaul, and aircraft accidentally destroyed.









N = Total Aircraft purchased
NOVW
= A^ r win9 aircraft
RCVW = Refresher air wing aircraft
N = Aircraft in overhaul or repair (pipeline)
N = Attrition allowance.
The allownace for refresher air wings is a percentage factor
of the attack air wing aircraft. Pipeline aircraft are a percentage
of the sum of all operating aircraft. Finally, allowance for
attrition is a function of the total number of aircraft flying, the
number of hours flown annually, and the planned service life of the
aircraft
.
Planned flying hours for each type of aircraft are listed in
the Navy Program Factors Book
,
OPMAV 90P-02, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL).
A variation is observed from year to year in the number of hours
planned. It appears to be a function of the expected appropria-
tions level. In order to simplify computation, representative
average figures have been selected for each type of aircraft.
Attrition may be derived from the U. S, Naval Aviation Safety
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Center publication U.S. Navy Aircraft Accident Statistics(U)
,
Fiscal years 1955-1964 (CONFIDENTIAL). The attrition rate per
100,000 flying hours has exhibited a declining value for each
type of aircraft as the total operating experience of the fleet
with the type accumulates. An example for a hypothetical air-
craft 5 the A-8, would be as follows:
A-8 Attrition Rate (per 100,000 hours)
Model Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Attrition 35 31.3 26,1 20,4 12.2 8.7 5.5 4.7 4.7 4.7
The service life of a first-line aircraft varies according
to its effectiveness, and as a function of technology, since new
developments lead to design of replacement aircraft when signifi-
cant breakthroughs occur. The A-l is still operational, although
it was designed at the end of World War II. The E-l was first
delivered in 1958; its replacement, the E-2, arrived in 1964. A
useful service life of seven years has been selected for a first-
line aircraft. It represents the statistical mean of first-line
airframe ages at the time of their transfer to the training command
or reserve forces, over the period since World War II.
With the factors available, total investment in each aircraft
can be calculated. Assume, for example, that the A-8 (a hypotheti-
cal aircraft) has been planned for introduction in 19 74, as out-
lined in the discussion thus far. Each Carrier Air Wing is to




have one squadron of 14 aircraft. Assume an allowance of 25%
for Refresher Wings, a pipeline factor of 10%, and annual flying
rate of 360 hours/year. The calculations are shown in Table 4.
In calculating aircraft buys for the three alternatives, the
existing air wings in 1968 were used as a starting point. Using
estimated planning factors and planned introduction schedules for
new aircraft, the total buy was calculated for the 1968-1980
period. The resulting time-phased purchase schedule and force
structure was then used in the cost analysis described below.
TABLE 6
A- 8 INVESTMENT
15 Carriers x 14 aircraft/carrier = 210 aircraft
25% refresher x 210 = 52
262
10% pipel ine 26
288
Attr ition = 288 aircraft x 360 hours/year x attrition rate
100,000
Year Model Year Attrition Rate Attrition
1974 1 35 36.288
1975 2 31.3 32.452
19 76 3 26.1 27.060
1977 4 20.4 21.151
1978 5 12.2 12.649
1979 6 8.7 9.020
1980 7 5.5 5.702
144.322
Total buy = 239 + 144 = 432 aircraft
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Escorts, in the form of Frigates (DLG and DLGN), and two types
of support ships, Ammunition ships (AE) and Oilers (AOR), are
assumed to be available as needed. Although these ships were not
directly included in the force alternatives, the cost of constructing
and operating one of each type was included in the cost estimation
for use in the effectiveness calculations and sensitivity tests.
FORCE ADJUSTMENT
The problem of marginal effectiveness in equal-cost cases was
outlined in Chapter II. In order to set each alternative equal to
the other in costs, adjustments are made in the aircraft inventory
only. The time-phasing of the ships is considered fixed, since it
forms a fundamental part of the hypothesis. Clearly the deck load
of helicopters or transports could be altered, but this would have
no effect on the force's selected measure of effectiveness. There-
fore adjustments will be made primarily in the attack aircraft load,
by buying more or less A- 7 aircraft for use on the AMERICA-class
and CVAN-2E-class carriers. A deck load of 100% capacity will not
be exceeded in these adjustments.
It is important that adjustments to the force structure alter
the effectiveness which is to be measured. Clearly a Volkswagen
and a Cadillac do not cost the same. If the measure of effective-
ness is the ability to carry the driver and two passengers from
one point to another, no amount of chrome-plated fixtures and
platinum hub-caps added to the Volkswagen to sec its cost at the
Cadillac level will alter the MOE by any significant amount.
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In amy event , it is fortunate that this analysis is only comparing
Ford with Chevrolet and Pontiac
.
Note that the marginal effectiveness sensitivity discussed
in Chapter II demands that all three alternatives be set equal
at each of the three levels determined by optimum force structures.
At each different discount rate, the cost difference will vary;
thus a total of 27 possible force structures will be estimated.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Conventional-powered escort ships have already been assumed
available for each carrier in the force. To test sensitivity in
this case, comparable nuclear escorts (4 DLGN) will be assigned to
each nuclear carrier in the alternatives. The additional cost will
then be compensated for by adjustments in the aircraft inventory.
A number of sensitivity tests have been proposed besides the
equal-cost, marginal-effectiveness test and the discount rate.
Length of the planning period is tested by extending the forces
through 1990, applying the same adjustment technique to set them
at equal cost.
In the escort case, no effort will be made to evaluate the
change in effectiveness gained by having an all-nuclear force.
The increase in mobility without the need for underway replenish-
ment is the primary factor here. However, no attempt will be made
to charge conventionally-powered escorts with replenishment re-
quiremenrs either. The assumption is that conventional-power
escorts will be fueled by the CVA which they escort. This is the
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normal procedure today, since escorts must be refueled every few
days when accompanying a carrier during flight operations. A
portion of the fuel oil on the carrier is reserved for this purpose,
A calculation of support ship requirements, and therefore
charges, is a function of the effectiveness scenario selected.
Discussion and examples are in Chapter IV.
Once a number of equal-cost alternatives have been constructed,
they must be operated in a hypothetical wartime scenario in order
to measure their relative effectiveness. The choice of that
scenario and its importance to the results obtained is fully




The critical importance of the measure of effectiveness to
the results of the analysis has been discussed several times thus
far. The MOE must be relevant to the assigned mission, and it
must be measurable. This is the only way in which a relative
ranking can be established between the several alternatives
specified.
Effectiveness can be defined as the ability of the force to
carry out its assigned mission. The most direct method of measure-
ment would be to actually exercise such a force in a real contin-
gency. This is impossible for a number of practical reasons, over
and above the fact that the forces themselves will not exist for
several years.
A highly useful abstraction from the real world is the use of
a modern high-speed computer to simulate conflicts, With a care-
fully designed program, forces can be brought to bear against the
enemy 3 and their resulting effectiveness measured. Attrition due
to enemy action can be included in an analysis of this type, thus
extending the value of the MOE.
In the absence of real-world forces and computer simulations,
a r simpler MOE must be accepted. One of the most important missions
of the Attack Carrier Striking Force is the provision of tactical




support is inadequate or unable to be brought to bear. The ready
availability of carrier forces has been demonstrated again and again,
both in situations where combat resulted, and where it did not;
Korea, Quemoy, Lebanon, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Viet Nam.
The capability to station a completely self-contained air base in
an area where potential conflict exists without the accompanying
diplomatic complications attendant upon airfield use agreements,
port unloading facilities, the American presence in the country in
an atmosphere of tension, etc. is a recommendation for its purchase
even if other methods of performing the same military mission were
sufficient for this country's world-wide commitments.
In a situation such as this, the theater commander is vitally
interested in the forces at his disposal. In particular, his ability
to meet a threat can be evaluated by measuring the total weapon
delivery of the force available to the commander throughout the
course of a postulated conflict. This capability has been selected
as the primary MOE for this analysis.
While the absolute level of effectiveness thus measured might
be questioned because of the numerous caveats presented in the
analysis, the relative level of the alternatives remains a valid
measure of their order of preference. The ranking is among alter-
native mixes of the same type force; thus many of the problems in-
herent in comparing different types of forces in performing the
same mission simply do not exist.
The MOE is -a variable, subject to a number of factors. The
total delivery depends on how fast the carriers can respond to the
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crisis (their mobility); the delivery rate of the carrier air wing,
which is itself a function of the mission and distance to be flown;
the carrier time-on-line between replenishments; ability to trans-
fer to a new location on short notice, should the situation change
unexpectedly; and vulnerability of the force to enemy action. All
of these factors will be addressed except the last. No attrition
other than normal peacetime attrition will be assumed, and replace-
ment aircraft will be provided from non-engaged air wings or the
pipeline whenever a loss occurs. Adequate analysis of the question
of vulnerability would be the subject of a complete study by itself.
In constructing a scenario to exercise the forces under the
conditions outlined, several steps are required:
1. The particular conflict must be specified in terms of
location, magnitude, warning time, and duration,
2. Theater forces available at the start of the conflict
must be determined,
3. An augmentation schedule must be constructed for the
additional forces to be committed.
4. The forces must be ?,played ?T to evaluate the MOE.
Sensitivity to the factors of mobility and duration will be
evaluated by using two separate scenarios with different charac-
teristics. The two will differ in terms of .
1. Distance from theater and augmenting force locations.
?„ Distance between underway replenishment area and resupply
base.
3. Duration of the conflict.
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Because the air wing inventory changes over time as new air-
craft are introduced, effectiveness will vary. In order to test
the sensitivity, the alternative forces will be exercised and
evaluated in two different years. One will be in the transition
period, 1973, when the force structure is most different in terms
of carriers available. The second will be 1975, when aircraft model
replacement will be considered complete for each class of carrier.
COMMON FACTORS
In all scenarios, certain factors are required. These will be
held constant from situation to situation.
Attrition has already been mentioned. Peacetime attrition was
assumed, with replacement by flying new aircraft to the ship as
needed. Loss of the usefulness of that aircraft until replace-
ment is allowed for in the sortie rate.
Air defense will be assumed constant for each force. The
capability of different aircraft will be taken into consideration;
i.e., one F-111B will be considered equivalent to two F-4 aircraft
for air defense. Although both the F-111B and the F-4 are capable
of carrying out attack missions, it is assumed that the full
fighter complement of these two aircraft is engaged in air defense
functions
.
The sortie rate for an aircraft is a function of the following
factors
:





4. weather and geography
5. assigned missions
6. operational factors.
Base facilities affect how long it takes to prepare an air-
craft for its next mission , and include the possible repair of
damaged or failed equipments. Aircraft characteristics include
ease of loading ordnance , and time to execute a mission, which is
a function of speed and distance to be covered. Pilots, weather
and geography determine the number of opportunities to fly in a
given day; pilot fatigue limits the number of missions each can
fly in a day, while weather and geography affect how long it takes
to fly each mission. An aircraft which needs daylight and clear
weather to find and attack its target will have fewer opportunities
to fly than an all-weather aircraft capable of delivering weapons
at any time. The specific target to be attacked may itself deter-
mine the opportunity; troops in combat are too mobile and present
little or no radar reflection for the all-weather aircraft, and
thus may be a poor target for night-time or overcast-day attacks.
The assigned mission, in terms of target type and distance
from base determine mission time, and thus opportunities to sortie.
Finally, operational factors, including aborted missions, peace-
time accidents, etc. will reduce the sortie rate capability.
Sortie rates for attack aircraft in the inventory have been
calculated with the aid of a computer program for another study.
1
NAVWAG 42 Tactical Air Warfare Study II (U), Vol. Ill,
Effectiveness Analysis, Appendix G (SECRET).
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These rates will be used in this analysis.
These sortie rates are calculated for carriers loaded with an
optimum air wing, which is less than 100% of parking capacity.
As the number of aircraft operating from the carrier changes from
the optimum, the sortie rate will tend to vary. No statistical
study has been carried out to date on this factor; however it
would be less than realistic to assume it does not exist. Based
on the author's experiences with four different carriers, the
following factors are assumed:
Deck spot factor Sortie rate
^ .95 ,90xS
,90 to .949 .95xS
.80 to .899 Calculated rate, S
£ .799 1.05xS
The change in sortie rate occurs because the ship has a
limited number of bomb elevators to bring up the weapons for
loading, because there is a relatively fixed number of men avail-
able to provide the weapons and load them, and because the time
required to re-spot the deck for launches and recoveries increases
when more aircraft must be moved. The final factor considered is
the fact that increased presure on the crew as a result of an
increased tempo of operations tends to lead to an increased num-
ber of flight-deck collisions between aircraft and between equip-
ment and aircraft. The result is that the over-all sortie rate of
the ship is reduced for increased deck loads.
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Targeting will affect the total weapon delivery capability,
since the mission and distance govern the ordnance load which can
be carried. To standardize this factor for the study, the following
targeting factor will be assumed:
Mission Distance Percent of Total Sorties
Close Air Support 300 Mi. 60
Air Superiority and
Interdiction 500 Mi. 40
Ordnance capability of the assigned aircraft as a function of
mission and distance have been calculated and plotted as a set of
curves in Appendix A. Calculations were based on data in the per-
formance handbook for each type, for standardized missions. Ordnance
payload capability was based on the following mission rules:
1. Reserve fuel to be 5 percent of initial total fuel plus
fuel for 20 minutes' loiter at sea level at the end of the mission.
2. Combat fuel is weight of fuel required for operation at
military rated thrust throttle setting for 5 minutes.
3. External pylons and fuel tanks will be retained at all
times.
Two standard profiles were used, as displayed in Figure 3.
Fuel and ordnance were selected to represent typical loads used for
each type of mission, since the variety of attack weapons and
external fuel tank capabilities prohibits complete calculation of
all possible alternatives. The resulting curves of aircraft
capability could be used in other postulated scenarios to further
extend the effectiveness testing, if time were available. Sample














































4 - 500 lbs Snakeye
3 - 1000 lbs. lo-drag
2 Bullpup Missiles










Mission 1 2 3 4
Fuel Distance Fuel Distance Fuel Distance Fuel Distance
Climb 2000 90 1700 75 2400 105 2200 100
Cruise out 3000 260 2000 190 750 45 2850 245
Descent 100 70 100 70 100 70 100 70
Run-in/out 6000 400 6000 400 6000 400 6000 400
Combat (5 min.
)
1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 -
Climb 850 60 850 60 850 60 850 60
Cruise in 2550 290 1950 205 600 90 2500 285
Descent/loiter 650 70 650 70 650 70 650 70



























1 72.5 -950 -68,875.0 5,256.25 902,500
2 -12.5 50 -625.0 156.25 2,500
3 -127.5 2,050 -261,375.0 16,256.25 4,202,500
4 67.5 -1,150 -77,625.0 4,556.25 1,322,500
Z -408,500 26,225.0 6,430,000
£ = Exi yi = -15.58
1
Y = d + 3 X
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It should be noted that the smooth curves plotted are only
approximations, since weapons come in discrete weight units. A
series of performance points were calculated, and a linear regress-
ion using least-squares techniques was performed to develop the
curves
.
Underway replenishment requirements vary for each scenario,
but the method of calculation is the same for each case. Replenish-
ment is a function of usage rate, and therefore the carrier's capa-
city for storing jet fuel, black oil (NSFO), and ordnance, These
last three will determine the length of time the carrier can remain
on the line, Underway replenishment must be calculated to be avail-
able at the expiration of this period, in the quantity required.
The distance between the underway replenishment area and the resupply
port, coupled with reloading time in port, determines how often a
given replenishment ship can provide supplies,
The first step is to determine time-on-line for each carrier
and air wing, Ship capacities of the three items being consumed
are listed for each class of carrier, Expenditure rates are then
calculated with the ship operating at maximum combat effort, One
simplification here is the assumption that the exact ordnance re-
quired for assigned missions is loaded aboard the carrier. The
real-life frustrations experienced by the Mission Planning Board on
every carrier in the fleet when the remaining ordnance is inappro-
priate for the assigned mission have been shared to a small degree
by the writer in years past.

63
Expenditure rates in tons per strike day for ordnance and
gallons (or tons) of jet fuel determine the number of days the
carrier can remain on-line before requiring replenishment
. For
NSFO, the additional black oil required for transit to and from
the replenishment area, plus a day's expenditure during underway
replenishment must be subtracted from usable capacity.
The shortest time of the three calculated determines the
number of days the carrier can remain on the line. The limita-
tion can be caused by NSFO, or either of the other two items. The
particular limitation varies among the ship classes considered.
A hypothetical example is given in Table 8.
Replenishments are planned to allow maximum daylight hours
for the carriers both while on-the-line and while replenishing
ammunition. Transits are made during darkness after the last
days' strikes have been recovered. Ammunition is replenished
first, followed by jet fuel and NSFO, which can extend into
darkness. Return transit is performed on completion of refueling,
so that strikes may commence at first light the following day,
The calculation method used leads to fractional ship require-
ments for a carrier. Such fractions may be considered valid
measure of requirements provided that the full capacity of the
individual ships can be utilized on each trip by the other forces
engaged in the operation. When expressed in terms of costs, the
fractional ship approach can be understood as a method of allocating
costs to marginal units, The assumption of a maximum combat effort







NSFO 100% 72,000 bbl.
reserve 30% 24,000 bbl.
available 70% 48,000 bbl.
Jet Fuel 100% 60,000 bbl.
reserve 10% 6,000 bbl.
available 90% 54,000 bbl.
ORDNANCE 100% 10,000 tons
usable 90% 9,000 tons
Expenditure Rates
NSFO 7,000 bbl. /day
Jet Fuel 6,000 bbl. /day
Ordnance 750 tons/day
Additional NSFO
Transit to URG 2,500 bbl.
Replenish 1,500 bbl. <
Strike Endurance at Maxi.mum Rates
NSFO 6.3 days
Jet Fuel 9.0 days
Ordnance 12.0 days
Time-on-line = 6 days
Replenishment every 7 days
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The actual number of replenishment ships required to support
a force in any given situation can be determined mathematically if
certain factors are known or can be reasonably assumed. We have
discussed the calculation of carrier time-on-line; this generates
the demand; what supplies are required, how much, and how often.
We must also know the characteristics of the replenishment ships;
their capacities 5 their cycle times , and their cargo transfer rates.
The two replenishment ships we will consider are the AOR, for
fuel 3 and the AE for ammunition. For each type, the replenishment
ship cycle is calculated as follows;
TABLE 9
UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT GROUP CYCLE TIME
Distance from URG area to resupply port X miles
Speed of Advance (SO A) Y knots
Transit time (one way) X. = T days
Transit to port T days
In port delay and loading time L days
Transit to URG area T days
Standby/Replenish/Consolidate Cargo 1.0 day
Total cycle time = 2T+L+1.0 days = CT + T03 (See below)
With the cycle time and ship capacities known the numbers of






Cargo delivered per day = Material expended per day
or N x Y X
CT + TOS R
N = number of AOR or AE required




CT = cycle time = time to transit each way plus time to
load in port,
TOS = time on station = waiting time plus offload time




R = frequency of combatants' replenishment (in days)
For example 3 using a hypothetical CVA and AOR:
N
Y ~ 180 9 000 barrels
CT = 8 days
TOS = 1 day
CVA POL - X = 60,000 barrels (POL = petrc
R = 7 days
AOR 60 <,000 barrels 8 days + 1 dayt\\JL\
7" days 180,000 barrels
= 60,!°°£L x 9 = 1 = 43 AOR
7 ~
X 180,000 7 '^ UK
Replenishment charges will be calculated for each, carrier type
a? a secondary MOE. No attempt will be made to incorporate these
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charges into the equal-cost structures by compensating adjustments
in attack aircraft. The implications of replenishment charges




Any scenario selected for study is obviously arbitrary. A
complete evaluation of the alternatives would require an almost
infinite number of different ones,, Because of the time constraints
on a single analyst, just two have been selected „ They differ in
distance from supporting forces and in duration , in order to test
the sensitivity of the MOE to response time of the carrier from
its starting point and its capability to remain on the firing line
once it arrives. The framework outlined could be extended to addi-
tional scenarios with little additional effort , if further testing
appeared necessary.
A non-nuclear confrontation is not difficult to envision; six
of them were mentioned at the beginning of the Chapter. It is
important that the scenario postulated serve as an appropriate
vehicle to exercise the alternative forces and allow their effective-
ness to be measured.
In both cases j the situation consists of a no-warning surprise
attack. The apparent goal of opposing forces is rapid consolida-
tion of limited gains followed by a negotiated cease-fire. The
assumption is that the situation is critical enough to warrant
employment of as much of our tactical air power as possible while
maintaining pre-hostilities posture elsewhere. It is further
sumed that conditions do not warrant acceleration of overhaul
schedules to bring other carriers into the conflict, and that con-
tributions by the Marine and Air Force tactical air wings is constant
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It was pointed out that the primary MOE would be the total tonnage
of ordnance available for delivery during the conflict; this implies
that sufficient targets exist to warrant such delivery.
Two areas which immediately come to mind for scenarios are
Europe and Southeast Asia s the first because of our National interest
in the Continent and its defense , and the second because our forces
are currently engaged there. It is felt that more can be contri-
buted by selecting two different areas than by re-examining those
which have been thoroughly covered by other analysts.
For each scenario 9 we must specify the location and duration.
The theater forces available are a function of current peacetime
deployment schedules. Force augmentation is calculated considering
overhaul schedules and the requirement to maintain pre-hostilities
posture elsewhere in the world.
The force deployment schedule and time-on-line data for each
type of carrier will determine how many days each ship will be
employed in the conflict. Applying delivery capability on the
schedule presented earlier will result in calculation of total
tonnage delivery during the conflict.
An analysis of support-ship requirements can be made separately.
It is a function of the location of resupply ports and their dis-
tance from the underway replenishment area,, as well as the demands
imposed by the carriers.
Scenario A
Tension has been mounting in the Middle East., centering in





























































































Fleet Locations: 1st - Eastern U.S. Coast
2nd - Western U.S. Coast
6th - Mediterranean Sea
7th - Western Pacific
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attempted j supported by revolutionary forces from all neighboring
countries. Iran appeals to the United States for help in putting




The attack carrier striking force is deployed as outlined in
Table 10. The two Mediterranean carriers in the 6th Fleet are
ordered to deploy to the waters East of Cyprus to conduct close
air support and interdiction operations. At the same time, one
carrier is ordered to make ready and deploy from Norfolk to oper-
ate East of Cyprus, and one carrier from the 7th Fleet is ordered
from Manila to operate in the Gulf of Oman, South of Iran.
Because of the political situation throughout the Middle
East, resupply of the forces az sea will be provided by ships
operating from Italy in the Mediterranean and Karachi in the Indian
Ocean area. Figures 5 and 6 display the geographic relationships
involved.
The Commander, Sixth Fleet asks his staff to provide him with
an estimate of the maximum ordnance tonnage which can be delivered
from the start of operations to D+29, a thirty-day period. Support
ship requirements must also be calculated for carriers operating
on the line.
The ENTERPRISE is operating in the Eastern Mediterranean,
and can commence operations on D-day. The AMERICA-class carrier
in the Western Mediterranean arrives in time to commence operations
on Dtl. Arrival time of augmenting carriers is a function of




































powered ships are assumed to transit to the operating area at 27
knots j making good a 25-knot Speed of Advance or SOA. The CVAN can
transit at 30 knots, making good a 28-knot SOA. The difference is
due entirely to best speed for fuel economy considerations, not
seaworthiness. Augmentation for each alternative is listed in
Table 11.
Time-on-line for each class of carrier has been discussed pre-
viously. A hypothetical example was given. Using the augmentation
schedule and time-on-line data, total days on-line for each carrier
can be calculated. Weapon delivery rates can then be applied for
the conditions outlined, and the total ordnance delivery capability
determined.
Results of the calculations using the hypothetical data pre-
viously derived are shown in Table 12. A calculation of this
form will be made for each alternative force structure, for each
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SAMPLE EFFECTIVENESS IN SCENARIO A
BASIC PLAN — 1973
Carrier Class Enterprise America America Hancock
Arrival D + D + 1 D + 10a D + 7b
c
Time-on-line 6 days 6 days 6 days 6 days
Strike Days 26 25 18 20
Ordnance Rate 750 tons/day 650 tons/day 650 tons/day 550 tons/day
Total Ordnance 19,500 16,250 11,700 11,000
Total Ordnance Capability of the Force = 58,450 Tons.
Notes: 1 days' loading plus 8.9 days' transit with top-off of
fuel tanks on arrival from Norfolk.
Ship deploys on D-day from Manila






For some time the Caribbean Sea had been percolating with un-
rest. Intelligence estimates had forecast possible Cuban inter-
ference in the affairs of almost every island and country surround-
ing the sea. The sudden military overthrow of the government in
Venezuela did not come as a surprise, although the rapid reinforce-
ment of the insurrectionists with Cuban-supplied Soviet war materials,
including bombers and fighters , was an unexpected development. The
announced aim of the rebels 1 plan to "Crush reactionary Imperialism
throughout our hemisphere!!" caused the OAS to declare that the
putting down of the rebellion was vital to preservation of freedom
in the Caribbean.
Events moved rapidly, and on D+l the first attack carrier
arrived on the scene from Puerto Rico to provide support for the
Marine Division landing from the Amphibious forces who had been
kept at sea for just such an emergency. The Carrier Division
Commander evaluated the threat, and requested Commander Second
Fleet to provide two more carriers for the operation. The lack of
air bases ashore for air support operations prompted this request.
The Division Commander expects the entire operation to last
14 more days, or until D+15 . He asks his staff to provide him with
estimates of the maximum ordnance tonnage which can be delivered
by the force, and the support ship requirements. Resupply will be
provided through Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico.
Figure 7 displays the geographic relationships. Table 13 lists
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calculation similar to that for Scenario A, for a hypothetical case
TABLE 14
SAMPLE EFFECTIVENESS IN SCENARIO B
ALTERNATIVE I — 1975
Carrier Class Enterprise America America
Arrival D + 1 D + 4a D + 5 b
Time-on-line 6 days 6 days 6 days
Strike Days 13 11 10
Ordnance Rate 750 tons/day 650 tons/day 650 tons/day
Total Ordnance 9,750 7,150 6,500
Notes




Support ship requirements for each scenario are computed as
described at the beginning of the chapter. Carrier time-on-line
will be the same for a carrier with the same air wing composition
in any scenario; the main difference in calculation of ship
requirements is the distance between the Resupply base and the
Underway Replenishment area. Allowing a 250-mile retirement from
the operating area for replenishment results in the following
transit distances for supply ships:
Italy 750 miles
Karachi 150 miles
Roosevelt Roads 250 miles
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The result of increasing distance is to incrase N when the
formula is applied. This is a logical result, since a longer
transit means more supply ships must be enroute between base and
URG area to fill the "pipeline" being used.
Support ship "requirements" are tabulated as the fractional
ship charges for each class, in Appendix D. The implications of
this requirement are discussed in Chapter V, where the unclassified




The production manager of the Edge-Ring Division may be a bit
surprised when his analysts report the results of their study. That
is, he will be if he expects the "answer" to his equipment replace-
ment schedule. It was pointed out in Chapter II that cost-benefit,
or cost-effectiveness analysis does not make the decision. It
presents the necessary information regarding the proposed alterna-
tives in such a way that the decision-maker has a clear picture of
the results of his decision, no matter which alternative is chosen.
The results of the analysis of the proposed alternative methods of
replacing the HANCOCK-class carriers are designed to do just that
for the Navy Department. This chapter contains an unclassified
summary, while Appendices B, C, and D contain the actual results
obtained.
The three alternatives were first set up at their optimal
level, using proposed Carrier Air Wing complements for each class
of carrier. The result, in terms of cost, was not surprising.
Alrernative One was less expensive, since conventional-power was
substituted for nuclear power in the last two carriers. The air
wings are slightly smaller, although the percentage of deck-spot
was held essentially constant for each ship class.
Alternative Two was the most expensive, since the early pur-
chase of A- 7 and F-lll aircraft for the replacement carriers meant
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they would be operated for one or two more years than those for the
basic plan. The additional operating costs raised the total.
Results of the initial force construction are shown in Table 15
as percent difference from the cost of the basic plan.
TABLE 15
ALTERNATIVE FORCE COSTS, PERCENT OF BASIC PLAN
Discount Rate
.10 .15
Alternative 1980 -0.3% -0.4 -0.3
1 1990 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6
Alternative 1980 +0.4 +1.1 +1.5
2 1990 +0.1 +0.8 +1.2
The relative share of costs attributable to ships and air-
craft remained essentially constant over the range of discount
rates and time periods examined. For carriers and aircraft alone,
the ratio was 17% for carriers, 83% for air wings. If each
carrier is assigned 4 DLG-type escorts, the breakdown is 12% for
carriers, 20% for escorts, and 68% for air wings. It is obvious
that the cost of buying and operating the aircraft themselves is
the largest part of the systems cost.
Force level adjustment was made to set each alternative equal
in cost to the other two alternatives by increasing or decreasing
the number of A- 7 aircraft purchased in 1972, and continuing
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through 1980 (or 1990) with the new force level. Since the America
and CVAN-2E classes were primarily involved in the alternatives, the
A- 7 level was varied only on these ships. The ENTERPRISE was in-
cluded with the CVAN-2E for air wing composition. In every case
it was possible to adjust cost levels without exceeding 100% of
deck spot space, or without reducing the coverage below 70%. The
resulting forces were then exercised in the two scenarios, with
revised aircraft complements for 1973 and 19 75. The results are
shown in Figures 8 through 15, for the tests conducted. Each figure
represents the exercise of each of the three plans at three cost
levels, in the two years set, for one scenario.
Consider what these figures represent; in terms of the selected
MOE, we have a series of marginal production curves. In effect,
these form the supply curves for our three alternatives. The de-
cision-maker is charged with the responsibility for determining the
location of the demand curve
,
and thus arriving at a choice. The
calculation of a demand curve is difficult, whether we are talking
about industry or the Department of Defense; it is subject to a
great deal more uncertainty than our production function, and is
often ignored or arbitrarily assumed in order to avoid the difficulty
of locating it. In any case, it is not the purpose of this analysis
to define the demand curve.
Note the relationship of the three alternatives as costs and
time vary. The basic plan is clearly less effective than either
alternative, since the HANCOCK-class carrier is much smaller and
less effecrive. The difference between Alternatives One and Two
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is less, and changes as the conditions vary, but the pattern is clear,
As the nuclear alternative is reduced in cost, its effectiveness is
significantly reduced, especially in the 19 73 period. However, the
conventional-power alternative is able to just match the effective-
ness of the nuclear one at the highest cost level, and then only in
some of the cases. The slope of the curves illustrates the points
discussed in Chapter II for production. If the requirement for
Attack Carrier Striking Forces is expected to increase in the future,
the nuclear alternative is more capable of expansion than the con-
ventional one. Once again, the location of the demand curve is
significant.
One of the factors which affects the capability of the forces
in Alternative One at the highest cost level is the reduction in
sortie rate caused by high-percentage deck loads. This was discussed
in Chapter IV, where it was noted that no study has been made to
date of the actual effect. An indication of an alternative adjust-
ment may be found in a sensitivity test made in a recent study.
An investigation was made into the cost of placing a CVAN-2E size
carrier air wing on an AMERICA-class hull, keeping deck spot per-
centage constant. The resulting cost for the additional aircraft
and hull modifications was greater than the cost differential for
the nuclear-powered carrier and air wing.




Another method of setting the alternatives at equal cost would
be to change the number of F-111B aircraft purchased. For the 1967-
1980 period, 1 F-111B would represent the cost of more than 4 A- 7;
however, the resulting change in effectiveness could not be evaluated
with this model.
Cost of providing nuclear escorts was evaluated by calculating
the marginal cost of one DLGN over one DLG of comparable tonnage and
armament* Provision of 4 nuclear escorts for a nuclear carrier would
mean the elimination of nearly all the A- 7 aircraft embarked aboard,
if cost is to be held constant,, The result would be to reduce
effectiveness to an insignificant level, in the model used here
.
The
increase in effectiveness of the force due to increased mobility and
reduced vulnerability cannot be evaluated unless a more elaborate
model is constructed. Thus no meaningful conclusion can be drawn
regarding the true value of nuclear escorts within this study.
The possibility of providing Alternative Two at the same cost
as the basic plan still exists. Note that Alternative Two is more
effective than the basic plan, even at the same cost level. Testi-
mony by the Secretary of Defense proposed the maintenance of 15
attack carriers with 12 air wings (plus the two refresher training
wings); ships in overhaul would release their air wings for use
aboard those at sea. This alternative, although not addressed in
this study, could result in reduced over-all cost with no reduction
U.S., Congress, House, Hearings, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966,
Part 1, p. 150.
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in effectiveness, short of an all-out war in which all forces would
be committed. It is generally agreed that a war of such magnitude
would most certainly be nuclear, and reduced numbers of carrier air
wings would not affect the result.
The requirement for support by AE and AOR ships while conducting
combat operations was evaluated in Appendix D. Requirements change
as a result of distance changes between resupply port and underway
replenishment area, generally because more replenishment ships are
needed to fill the "pipeline" as distance increases. Percentage
differences for the AMERICA-class compared with the CVAN-2E class






URG Distance 19 73 1975
750 Miles 112% 116
250 " 101 106
150 " 99.8 104
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The major difference is caused by the requirement for NSFO or
black oil by the conventional-powered ship. For the 150-mile case
in 1973, requirements are slightly less for the AMERICA-class be-
cause its ordnance-delivery capability is markedly less, and there-
fore it requires a much smaller fraction of AE supply.
In summary, as can be seen graphically in Figures 8-15, the
analysis indicates that Alternatives One and Two are both more
effective than the basic plan, under all variations applied to test
sensitivity. Alternative One is more effective than Alternative Two
at lower cost levels and earlier time-frames, but Alternative Two
becomes more effective than Alternative One at high cost levels and
later times. The slope of the "supply" curves indicates that the
nuclear alternative has more capability of increased expansion in
future years.
Nuclear escorts do not appear worth the marginal cost in the
framework of this model, but their contribution to effectiveness
has not been evaluated. No meaningful conclusion can be drawn
because of the limited framework in which they have been examined.
Replenishment ship requirements are less for nuclear carriers
than conventional-powered carriers. Ammunition requirements are
greater, but fuel requirements are significantly smaller, causing
the overall reduction.
Perhaps the best way to conclude the analysis is to list the
alternatives which were not studied, indicating where more work
could be done. The vulnerability of the force to enemy opposition
has been discussed a number of times. Its evaluation is the subject
of continuing study throughout the Department of Defense.
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More directly involved are such items as effectiveness of the
various fighter complements in air defense and attack groups escort;
effect of tanker aircraft and electronic countermeasures (ECM) air-
craft in terms of contribution to the mission; capability of the
force under bad-weather conditions or darkness; and nuclear delivery
capability, if it is called for.
Even a short listing cannot address all the questions which
affect the proper force level and force mix for the Attack Carriers.
Changes in force level have been studied, as well as substitutes
for the force itself. Each of these is pertinent to a particular
decision level, and each must be addressed to arrive at the most
effective allocation of this Nation's scarce resources in providing
for its security. This paper is an attempt to make a small contri-
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